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In the last 15 years, the quality movement has addressed the
variation between medical practices at all levels: between
physicians within the same department, between depart-
ments, between hospitals and between countries. Variation
is something like the smoke in the heurism: “Where there is
smoke, there is fire”: if medical decision making is rational,
how can there be variation in practice? However, the issue
of medical practice variation has long drawn attention from
researchers from outside the quality movement. Research-
ers assuming social conditions, financial incentives or
training are interested in variation. Of course, policy makers
are stakeholders in this variation debate. Judith de Jong
(2007) studies variation following Freidson (1975) and
Westert and Groenewegen (1999), assuming that especially
social conditions influence physicians’ medical behavior.
The prediction is that physicians' ways of working are more
similar if they share their work environment (a practice or
hospital). Social circumstances do more to shape their
behavior than their individual preferences. These ‘shaping’
processes are considered to be institutional. In describing
these, she uses Scott’s (2001) distinction among three
institutional mechanisms: the regulative, normative and
cultural-cognitive mechanisms. De Jong's idea is that once
the influence of a certain mechanism has been determined,
it should be possible to influence variation. To test her
hypotheses, De Jong uses secondary data from three
different databases: two from national surveys held among
general practitioners in The Netherlands and one from
hospitals in the United States.
Working in the same circumstances implies sharing
resources. In combination with visibility of behavior, this
will lead to less variation among physicians. This is what
she concluded from her analysis of the variation among
general practitioners. There could be several reasons for
this, such as adaptation of physicians to an existing way of
working or selection processes of new physicians. It seems
that circumstances themselves are most dominant in
explaining homogeneity of behavior. This not only down-
plays the role of adaptation and selection, but also the
importance of individual differences. In Chap. 4, this aspect
is further elaborated. Here, the hypothesis is tested that
physicians working in two hospitals act differently in those
hospitals. It appears that where two hospitals differ, e.g., in
length of stay, physicians work differently, even if they
work in both hospitals. Again, it was confirmed that
circumstances are important in understanding medical
practice variation.
In Chaps. 5 and 6, the behavior of physicians under
restrictive (regulative) circumstances is examined both for
physicians in the managed care system in the USA as well
as for general practitioners. Central here is the effect of peer
expectation and professional control translated into guide-
lines. The effect of the introduction on variation is
moderate. The author suggests that guidelines may have a
more substantial effect if combined with cultural-cognitive
tools, such as computerized decision aids. In Chap. 7, the
influence on variation of cultural-cognitive processes by using
a decision support system when prescribing was examined
for general practitioners in The Netherlands. It appears that
the use of a decision support system reduces variation only
when it does not allow any variation, for example, when only
one piece of advice is given for prescribing.
The implications for health policy are not so clear. The
author has some difficulty being precise about this. I think
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the main reason is that she carefully avoids the distinction
between desired variation and avoidable variation. There
are good reasons for this if there are mechanisms that
explain variation. From a quality or economic point of
view, variation is only a signal of something that maybe(!)
is not desirable. From a policy point of view, the issue is:
how do we avoid the wrong kind of variation? De Jong
discusses several strategies to reduce variation: payment-
for-performance and uniform performance indicators.
According to the author, this will lead to more uniformity
among practices and increasing dependencies within prac-
tices. This will reduces variation. However, the results of
her study show that using institutional mechanisms will
influence medical decision making, but not reduce varia-
tion. The author, however, expects (hopes?) that in the long
run, cognitive-culture tools will press physicians towards
homogeneity. An example is that she expects that perfor-
mance measurement and reimbursement systems will lead
to the separation of standardized medical care in high
volume clinics. It is not clear, however, what such a process
would look like, and especially when this would be
desirable to prevent the wrong kind of variation. The
problem is that it is not clear how institutional processes
work when variation should be avoided and when it should
not. Probably often this is not clear. For these reasons, it is
difficult to predict how institutional mechanisms will
promote effective and efficient care. Variation is often an
important signal of non-effective and non-efficient care, but
not always.
To conclude, De Jong's work is highly original in
explaining variation from an institutional perspective. It
provides new and important insights into the mechanisms at
work in situations where physicians work and how these
pattern their actions.
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